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In recent years China’s rise has inspired 
megabytes of discussions and debates. Needless 
to say, China’s rise has influenced the interna-
tional structure dramatically. However at the same 
time, there is another phenomenon paralleling the 
rise of China. In other words, China has been 
playing a more and more important role in all 
kinds of international organizations in fields 
ranging from economics to security to culture, the 
environment, and so on. In a sense, China’s 
growing role in all kinds of international organi-
zations is part of the story of China’s rise. The 
Chinese government has attached more and more 
importance to international organizations than 
ever before. On November 8
th
, 2010, an article 
entitled “China Defines Its New Role in Interna-
tional Organizations” appeared in the authorita-
tive state-owned newspaper People’s Daily (Ren-
min Ribao), which could be recognized as China’s 
full consciousness of the importance of interna-
tional organizations and its public declaration of a 
comprehensive engagement with international 
organizations
2
. 
International organizations have been play-
ing more and more important roles in interna-
tional society. According to the latest statistics 
from the Union of International Organizations, 
there are now 63,993 international organizations, 
in all forms and disciplines
3
. The depth and 
breadth a country engages itself in international 
organizations reveal whether its diplomacy is 
mature or not. That’s primarily why China, as a 
rising power with increasing stakes in interna-
tional society, is attaching more and more impor-
tance to its deepening and expanding engagement 
with various international organizations.  
However, Chinas did not take an active 
stance towards international organizations for 
quite a long time after the war. Since the reform 
and open-up policy in the late 1970s, China has 
gradually changed its attitude and policy towards 
international organizations. The past decades 
witnessed a transformation of four stages in Chi-
na’s attitude toward international organizations. 
First, firmly opposing international organizations; 
second, holding reserved caution about interna-
tional organizations; third, joining international 
organizations actively; fourth, taking the leader-
ship in many international organizations and initi-
ating new forums and organizations. The incen-
tives behind this changing policy toward interna-
tional organizations lie in several aspects. First of 
all, globalization has made China closely associ-
ated with other countries as interdependence ac-
celerates; second, China has benefited from en-
gaging in international organizations and it could 
not continue to grow unless it keeps on being in-
volved in international organizations; third, Chi-
na’s rise has generated requests for leadership and 
participation from other countries, and therefore 
China must bear international responsibility. Cur-
rently the biggest agenda item that China is faced 
with concerning its role in international organiza-
tions is, how to correctly function in a leadership 
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position in international society and push forward 
the multi-polarization of the international system 
and enhance the effectiveness of the resolution of 
diverse international issues such as 
non-proliferation, poverty, global warming and so 
on.  
 
I. From Resistance to Embrace: the Evolving 
Process 
 
Just as a leading Chinese scholar pointed out, 
China’s relationship with international organiza-
tions has experienced a process from denial to 
admitting, from playing common roles to striving 
for important positions, from highlighting domes-
tic necessities to more concern about international 
image. The transformation reflects the changes in 
the perspectives from which Chinese leaders view 
the outside world, as well as China’s necessities 
with regard to international organizations
4
.  
In general, the process of China’s engage-
ment with international organizations can be di-
vided into four stages. The first stage was from 
1949 to 1971. China resisted participation in in-
ternational organizations and had very limited 
connections with very few international organiza-
tions in this period. This was a time when China 
was outside the UN system, and ideologically 
impacted by the confrontational and antagonistic 
Cold War mentality. The basic situation China 
faced was isolation from international society, 
which limited its participation in and shaped its 
attitude towards international organizations. The 
view that Chinese leaders held about international 
organizations at this stage was rather negative and 
even hateful. China did not participate in the in-
ternational organizations, basically because China 
did not trust the guidelines of any international 
organization. The speeches delivered by Premier 
Zhou Enlai and other leaders then showed that 
China was conservative and prudent about the UN 
and other international organizations. In China’s 
view, these international organizations were con-
trolled by western powers while third world 
countries had little leverage. Thus it reflected the 
inequality of international political reality
5
. Under 
such circumstances, China had very limited 
choices. The first was to link with the interna-
tional organizations in the socialism camp. The 
second was to develop relationships with interna-
tional organizations in developing country blocs. 
Some direct examples were the Geneva Confer-
ence in 1954 at which Premier Zhou Enlai fa-
mously put forward the Five Principles of Peace-
ful Co-existence (Heping Gongchu Wuxiang Yu-
anze), and the Asian-African Conference or 
Bangdung Conference in 1955 which convened 
most of the Third World countries, as well as 
China’s intimate relationships with the Group of 
77 and Non-aligned Movement. Meanwhile, 
China also had never given up its effort to resume 
its legitimate seat in the UN. 
The second stage was from 1971 to 1978. In 
this period China gradually came to take some 
steps in its participation in international organiza-
tions. Actually in the 1970s even after China had 
regained its seat in the UN, it did not choose to 
engage in diplomacy with many international 
organizations as some predicted and anticipated, 
instead it still held a passive stance. This could be 
explained from two aspects. One was that in the 
1970s the UN was still the competing arena for 
the US and the Soviet Union under the framework 
of the Cold War. The other more profound reason 
lay in China’s domestic factor. China’s diplomatic 
conceptions and foreign policies had been influ-
enced by the Cultural Revolution and the ul-
tra-leftist ideology. China thought of the UN as 
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the tool of the capitalist controlled by the US and 
the Soviet Union. Therefore China only took the 
UN as a formal forum in the period, with little 
expectation for it to maintain world peace. 
Though China did not take active steps in partici-
pating in the UN and some other major interna-
tional organizations, its attitude had changed a lot 
compared to the first stage. Therefore, it tried to 
established connections with some social and 
cultural organizations. For example, China joined 
a series of organizations in non-political areas 
within the UN system, such as UNDP and 
UNESCO, and also resumed and developed its 
relationship with the International Olympic 
Committee, International Standards Organization, 
and so on. 
The third stage was from 1978 to 1989. 
From 1978, China confirmed its reform and 
open-up policy, and strengthened its interaction 
and communication with the outside world, which 
in turn led to a boom in its participation in inter-
national organizations. In this period, China not 
only developed its relationship with international 
political organizations, but also began to establish 
relationships with organizations in wide-ranging 
areas like economic, trade, finance, culture and 
scientific technology, and so on
6
. Particularly after 
entering the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping advocated that 
China should both struggle and cooperate in for-
eign affairs including within the international or-
ganizations, aiming at establishing a new interna-
tional order based on the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence. Therefore when Deng was 
in power, the number of international organiza-
tions China participated in and the breadth and 
depth of its participation were unprecedented 
comparing to Mao’s era. The essence of Deng’s 
strategy on international organizations was to 
obtain a stable and peaceful international envi-
ronment for domestic economical development 
by acknowledging the existing international insti-
tutions
7
.
 
The most evident was the significantly 
expanded participation in economic and financial 
organizations. This was largely due to the central 
strategy of concentrating on economic develop-
ment as the major national goal, which was con-
firmed by the Third Plenary Session of the 11
th
 
Central Committee (Shiyijie Sanzhong Quanhui). 
The direct reason was the foreign investment and 
capital for booming economic development. Deng 
Xiaoping, the general strategist and architect of 
China’s reform and open-up policy, pointed out 
that China must first fulfill its economic mod-
ernization, which means the Chinese economy 
must shift from the Stalinist model to an inde-
pendent one relying more on export. Therefore 
participation in major international organizations 
became indispensable
8
. In 1980, China regained 
its membership in the most influential interna-
tional economic and financial organizations such 
as the IMF, the World Bank, and also formally 
joined the ADB (Asian Development Bank) in 
1986. Through these major organizations, China 
obtained large volumes of funds and aids to con-
struct the infrastructures nationwide which were 
fundamentally important for the preliminary stage 
of economic development. Apart from economic 
organizations, China also began to show its inter-
est in organizations concerning peace keeping, 
disarmament and arms control. Before the 1980s, 
China used to resist UN peace keeping operations, 
since China held the view that an intervention by 
a UN controlled by hegemonic powers could 
never be justice. With the rapprochement in the 
late 1980s, and the alleviation of the confrontation 
between the US and the Soviet Union, China be-
gan to build its confidence in UN peace keeping. 
For example, in 1984, China proposed its seven 
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principles for UN peace keeping operations. In 
1988 China formally became a member of the 
UN Peace Keeping Special Committee.   
The fourth stage was the post-Cold War era, 
from 1990 until now. During this period, China 
not only has comprehensively expanded and 
deepened its engagement in a diversity of interna-
tional organizations, but also has tried to play a 
more and more active and leading role in many 
organizations. At the initial stage, because of the 
1989 Tiananmen Incident, China was once strictly 
sanctioned and isolated by the Western countries. 
Therefore, to break through the predicament, 
China tried hard to promote and strengthen multi-
lateral diplomacy in international organizations, 
and gradually formed a strategy of highlighting 
both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. From 
the middle of 1990s, as China’s economic and 
military power began to grow at high rates, the 
“China threat” claim also rapidly gained momen-
tum in some Western and neighboring countries. 
To avoid being perceived as a threat and deliver a 
more transparent and accountable image, China 
made efforts to show its responsibility by contrib-
uting to the activities in many international or-
ganizations. Needless to say, in this period, the 
depth and breadth of China’s participation in in-
ternational organization has dramatically in-
creased. Nowadays almost in all the major inter-
national organizations covering all the areas, poli-
tics, economics, security, military, environment, 
climate, culture, etc, China’s voice can be heard. 
In 2003, the number of influential international 
governmental organizations (IGOs) that China 
joined was 41, accounting for 91.11% of that of 
the US. In 1996, this number was only 70%
9
. This 
marked a remarkable growth in China’s participa-
tion.  
Most importantly, there are some milestones 
of China’s unprecedented expansion of engage-
ment in international organizations, and the dra-
matic change in its attitude towards international 
organizations. For example, after long years of 
pursuit, China was finally awarded membership 
in the WTO in 2001. Even though entering the 
WTO meant not all opportunities but also tre-
mendous challenges, particularly for China’s ag-
riculture which was by no means competitive 
internationally, this was among the most encour-
aging events in the year. In the same year, China 
convened some Asian countries and established 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the 
annual Boao Forum based in Hainan Province in 
China was also initiated. These two events mani-
fested that China had become so active as to take 
the leadership of establishing and initiate new 
international organizations or forums. One thing 
which is also worth noting is that in the same year, 
China successfully won the bid for the 2008 
Olympic Games. Owing to these enormous 
strides that China has made in its engagement 
with international organizations, some people thus 
even argued that the year 2001 marked the wa-
tershed when China began to really connect with 
the world. What’s more, as the new century un-
folds, when China’s economic development has 
no sign of slowing down, its influence in interna-
tional organization and its position in international 
society have been also experiencing another tide. 
That is part of the reason why some people claim 
that the 21
st
 century would be China’s century; at 
least the first ten years saw the unprecedented 
ascent of China’s international position.   
 
 
 
II. Comprehensive Engagement and the Incen-
tives 
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As mentioned above, China was initially not 
active in participating in international organiza-
tions. Its expanding and deepening engagement in 
international organizations is a gradually evolving 
historical process. The basic characteristic of 
China’s current participation in international or-
ganizations can be summarized as a comprehen-
sive engagement with all kinds of international 
organizations in wide-ranging areas. After doubt, 
hesitation, reappraisal, reflection, and reconsid-
eration, China has completely abandoned its 
old-style of thinking about international organiza-
tions. Instead, it has set up a new national strategy 
of engaging international organizations, making 
enormous efforts to join in addressing common 
global agendas through international organiza-
tions, attaching significant importance to multi-
lateral diplomacy in international organizations. A 
textbook for college students offering a general 
introduction on international organizations vividly 
reflected this rising power’s strategic vision on 
multilateral diplomacy and comprehensive en-
gagement with international organizations. This 
book says, “As a great power in the world, China 
has gradually become an important force in the 
international society, therefore we must intimately 
cooperate and coordinate with the United Nations 
and other international organizations, and play an 
active role in these organizations. Only by doing 
so, China can do more contribution to the interna-
tional society. 
10
”
  
It is publicly recognized that in 
recent years China’s influence has been increasing 
tremendously. A direct manifestation is the grow-
ing number of senior officials in some leading 
international organizations. Below is a general 
review of Chinese nationals appointed top-ranked 
positions in some of the most influential interna-
tional organizations in recent years
11
.  
 
 
Name Position Assuming Year 
Margaret Chan Fung Fu-chun  Director-General of WHO 2007 
Sha Zukang Under-Secretary-General of UN  2007 
Lin Yifu Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of 
World Bank 
2008 
Zhu Min Special Advisor to the Managing Director of 
IMF  
2010 
Zhang Yuejiao  Justice of Dispute Settlement Body of WTO 2008 
He Changchui Deputy Director-General of UN FAO 2009 
Wang Binying  Vice Director-General of WIPO 2010 
 
As a result, China gains more and more in-
terest from international organizations, as well as 
contributes more and more to international or-
ganizations. Certainly more and more responsibil-
ity has been expected from China. In such a con-
text, China has promptly adjusted its policy and 
become more devoted to give rather than to gain. 
Centered on the UN and other leading interna-
tional governmental organizations, China has 
proactively increased its international contribution 
in recent years. One thing worth noting is that 
China has significantly and actively expanded its 
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commitments to UN operations. For example, 
China has raised its share of membership fees 
from 0.7% at the end of the 20
th
 century to 
2.053% in 2005, 2.677% in 2009, and a further 
promotion to 3.189% in 2010. Meanwhile, its 
peacekeeping fees share also increased from 
3.147% in 2009 to 3.939% in 2010. In addition, 
China is now dispatching the largest number of 
peacekeeping personnel among the Security 
Council members. In 2010, China continued to 
promise to provide more aid to other developing 
countries for the Millennium Development Goal 
of UN, including constructing schools, dispatch-
ing medical personnel, developing clean energy 
and ecological programs, reducing debts for the 
least developed countries, and so forth
12
.  
    The underpinning incentives for China’s 
fiercely changed attitude towards international 
organizations and its expanding strategic en-
gagement are multifaceted. First, engaging with 
international organizations serves China’s national 
interests and helps amplify its hard and soft power. 
Needless to say, China has received a lot of eco-
nomic benefits from economic and financial or-
ganizations. This is an important contributing 
factor for China’s past three decades of economic 
growth. Its participation in security dialogue and 
cultural communication also assured peaceful 
relationships with most neighboring countries and 
enhanced mutual understanding. Second, China 
has changed its view on the principle of sover-
eignty under the circumstance of globalization. 
The increasing trend toward global interdepend-
ence has accelerated in the 1990s, encouraging 
the evolution of some of the central concepts un-
derpinning international systems, including, fun-
damentally, the institution of state sovereignty
13
.
 
Globalization and global governance has put na-
tion states in a position of dilemma to some extent, 
as they are required to expose more and more 
internal affairs to the international society. Thus 
participation in international regimes means that 
part of the sovereignty must be transferred to the 
international society. With the humiliating his-
torical experience of being invaded territorially, 
China has long been extremely sensitive and cau-
tious about sovereignty. However, from the 1990s, 
it has gradually become acceptable for sover-
eignty transfer within international regimes. Third, 
ideology and value have experienced considerable 
transformation. In the Cold War era, ideology to a 
large extent influenced China’s foreign relations, 
and thus determined its attitude toward interna-
tional organizations. International organization 
diplomacy was limited by a confrontational men-
tality and the highlight on values in foreign policy. 
With the dilution of ideology in Chinese leaders’ 
world outlook and the practice of foreign policy 
decision-making, international organization di-
plomacy has become active and ramped up. So far 
China’s officials have said that although China 
has a distinctive political system and ideology, it 
can cooperate with other countries based on 
shared interest—although not, the suggestion 
seems to be, on shared values
14
.
 
Fourth, China has 
become more and more committed to its interna-
tional responsibility and national image. China 
has long been plagued by the China threat percep-
tion in the West and its neighboring countries. To 
neutralize the threat perception, China has con-
veyed clearly its devoted adherence to a peaceful 
rise in the past decade. However, the criticism and 
accusation of lacking transparency from Western 
countries never sees an end. Therefore, China 
determined to go out to show its commitment to 
peace and address its willingness to cooperate on 
the platform provided by various international 
organizations.   
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Ⅲ. Shifting Regimes and Rising State 
 
Both the current international regimes and 
the rising China are experiencing dramatic 
changes. In the context of fiercely undergoing 
globalization, with the compression of time and 
space made possible by modern technology, 
world politics has changed accordingly. First of 
all, nation-states are no longer the sole major enti-
ties in international society. More and more in-
fluential international organizations have risen up 
to play as global actors. Liberalists in interna-
tional relations argue that international regimes 
have the function of attracting and persuading 
countries to be more cooperative; especially ma-
ture and institutionalized regimes with effective 
regulations and rules could spur states to cooper-
ate while prevent them from conflicts. As the ma-
jor components of international regimes, interna-
tional organizations are not only becoming more 
and more important, but also experiencing pro-
found changes.  
The change of international organizations in 
international regimes under the current world sit-
uation could be elaborated from three aspects. 
First, the agenda focuses of international organi-
zations have changed from high politics, namely, 
the traditional military security issues, interna-
tional conflicts, peace and war to a series of low 
politics issues, such as non-traditional security, 
economic and financial crisis, social problems, 
environmental and energy issues, large-scale epi-
demics, and so on. Second, the types of interna-
tional organizations are also experiencing some 
change, which in turn results in a change in the 
cooperation approach among states in the organi-
zations. In the past, the concerted organization has 
been the prevailing type. Nowadays as the inter-
national environment changes, the new-
ly-emerging forum type of international organiza-
tions such as G20 have become more and more 
influential in many transnational agendas. This 
would definitely diversify the cooperation and 
interaction among different international actors. 
The third and the most important is that the deci-
sion-making institution is experiencing dramatic 
change. For quite a long time after the Second 
World War, developed countries have almost 
dominated all the right of decision-making in 
major international governmental organizations. 
However, developing countries are awarded more 
and more share of the right to make decisions and 
set up rules
15
. 
While the international organizations and the 
international regimes are facing the agenda of 
structural reform, China itself also has the ur-
gency to adjust its relationship with international 
regimes, including its foreign policy orientations 
with regard to international regimes. The interna-
tional order is proceeding towards a more mul-
ti-polarized and cooperative one, which poses 
both opportunities and challenges for states. Rob-
ert Keohane, the founder of the theory of interna-
tional regimes, famously noted that if world po-
litical economy is to continue to exist, the primary 
political dilemma would be how to organize in-
ternational co-operations without hegemony
16
.
 
And moreover, the nexus between states and in-
ternational organizations has become far more 
indispensable than ever before. A country’s influ-
ence in major international organizations can be 
transformed into effective leverages in terms of 
hard or soft power. Without exception, China 
must adapt its engagement with international re-
gimes to the rapidly changing world situation. 
There are a series of questions to be considered 
and reflected on with regard to China’s relation-
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ship with international organizations in the new 
world contour and global landscape of interna-
tional regimes. For instance, how to deal with the 
relationship between multilateral cooperation and 
the maintenance of national sovereignty; how to 
balance the participation in Western-led interna-
tional regimes and the protection of China’s own 
national interests; how to utilize international or-
ganizations as a useful platform to convince the 
international society that China is committed to a 
peaceful rise, and so on.  
Given the transformation that international 
regimes are experiencing, specifically speaking, 
there are several aspects that China should pay 
attention to. First, China should continue to attach 
more importance to multilateral diplomacy with 
international organizations, and synthesize diplo-
macy with states and that with international or-
ganizations. China’s diplomacy is becoming less 
country-oriented and more multilateral and is-
sue-oriented. The shift toward functional focuses 
has complicated China’s bilateral relationships, 
regardless of how friendly other states are toward 
it
17
. Therefore any bilateral relationship must have 
complementary diplomatic efforts in a diversity of 
issue-oriented cooperative frameworks, which are 
supplied by international organizations in differ-
ent areas. The participation in international multi-
lateral regimes helps reshape and recalibrate the 
relationship with other powers. The existence of 
interest divergence among states is inevitable. 
However, the cooperation with other states within 
the multilateral frameworks can effectively help 
reduce and eliminate the divergence and prevent it 
from leading to conflicts
18
.
 
Second, the interaction 
with international organizations can by no means 
just be the recognition of and abidance by interna-
tional regulations, neither does it mean restraints 
and constraints on China by international regimes; 
rather it requires China to confirm and accept 
justice and fair rules and regulations, reject and 
decline the unreasonable and unjust ones, and 
under some occasions contribute some creation 
and development to international regimes
19
. Third, 
China must bear in mind the fact that it is still a 
developing country, even though its international 
influence is booming. Internationally recognized 
as it is, many thorny and urgent domestic issues 
and agendas still remain to be solved. For exam-
ple, the expanding wealth disparity, the legitimate 
governance of minority ethnic groups, the eco-
nomic structural and industrial reforms, the aging 
population in large scales in the coming decades, 
and so on. None of these domestic issues is less 
urgent than its international responsibility. There-
fore China should adhere to its domestic reforms 
while engaging with international organizations, 
and should make use of international resources 
and talents to help address its domestic issues.  
 
Ⅳ. Pointing to the Future: Free-rider or 
Stake-holder? 
 
The interdependence between states and in-
ternational organizations is further increasing. 
Nation states more and more rely on international 
organizations to address regional security, eco-
nomic, and social problems. Nation states have to 
accept such a basic fact that international organi-
zations have gained more and more share in deal-
ing with many international affairs. The strength-
ening of the relationship between states and in-
ternational organizations is also an irreversible 
trend. As a result, those states who want to enjoy 
more say and leverage in international affairs 
must first have enough share in a wide range of 
major international organizations. No single 
country can afford to stay outside international 
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regimes which are now basically characteristic of 
a series of international organizations and forums. 
Under such circumstances, the borderline be-
tween domestic and foreign agendas has been 
more and more blurred. Many domestic affairs 
can not be solved without international involve-
ment, and sometimes, even though states are not 
willing to, they just have no choice but to expose 
their domestic affairs into much more transparent 
and open international debate and discussion. This 
challenge, rising from the ramping influence and 
rising position of international organizations, is 
also an opportunity for states as well.  
It is under such circumstances that China 
gradually changed its attitude towards interna-
tional organizations and began to conduct com-
prehensive engagement with international re-
gimes. These international organizations had fur-
ther helped China’s economic development and 
its modernization. China has harnessed abundant 
resources including capital and technology to 
meet its rapid necessity since the beginning of 
reform and open-up policy
20
. Participation in a 
wide range of international organizations has also 
strengthened China’s leverage on a series of glob-
al affairs and thus raised its international influence. 
There is no doubt that China has gained a lot from 
international organizations.  
Many foreign scholars therefore criticize 
China’s participation in international organiza-
tions as free-riding. China has been accused as a 
free-rider in a variety of areas such as technology 
transfer, arms control and climate change issues
21
. 
Those who have little knowledge about China’s 
domestic situation even assert that China always 
speculates to enjoy the benefits and escape from 
obligations by labeling itself as a developing 
country. Namely, the identity of China as a de-
veloping country does not match the reality, in 
their assumption. Western countries also claim 
that China has burdened too little responsibility 
while enjoying the benefits from international 
participation. In response to the Western criticism, 
China has championed a slogan of acting as a 
responsible great power (Zuo Fuzeren de Daguo). 
Meanwhile it has consciously increased its con-
tribution to the international society by a large 
volume. For example, China kept raising its per-
centage of the UN membership fees in the past 
years. It also has expanded its foreign assistance 
to other developing countries. China continues to 
contribute to regional peace and stability, espe-
cially the in the Asia-Pacific region.
22 
China 
promised not to depreciate RMB in the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, and also played an impor-
tant role in the recovery of the stagnating world 
economy hit by the last financial tsunami. In al-
most all the areas of global agendas, China has 
taken much more cooperative and accountable 
stances and steps.  
Although China may have initially joined 
international organizations for its own ends, the 
level of its liberal action has increased 
hand-in-hand with the increase in the number of 
international organizations China participates in. 
This supports neo-liberal institutionalist theory, 
which asserts that international regimes and or-
ganizations will influence state behavior through 
the limitations they impose on state freedom of 
action, specifically, by reinforcing reciprocity 
between states and making defection from the 
norms easier to punish
23
. The concept of sociali-
zation has also recently gained currency among 
Western scholars and policy analysts. They argue 
that “states are embedded in dense networks of 
transnational and international social relations that 
shape their perceptions of the world and their role 
in the world. States are socialized to want certain 
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things by the international society in which they 
and the people in them live.
 24
” If this socializa-
tion theory is true, China is being gradually so-
cialized into the current international system. 
Then international society should see the future of 
China as a responsible stake-holder as promising.  
The unprecedented degree of interdepend-
ence among states under profound globalization 
has put nation states, particularly those great 
powers in the same boat, which they could not 
escape from. China has been bound with the 
whole international system, particularly in the 
economic area. This helps it forge common 
grounds and reinforce cooperation with other 
countries. Taking US-China relations as an exam-
ple, many argue that the ever-growing economic 
interdependence would add to the stability of bi-
lateral relations. It is because of this economic 
interdependence that the United States sees the 
policy of engaging with China much more effec-
tive than that of containing China. The primary 
goal in Sino-American economic relations is to 
secure China’s full compliance with the rules of 
the global trading system
25
.
 
Some Western schol-
ars also claim that China will not pose a threat but 
will be a responsible actor because “China today 
is growing not by writing its own rules…it is 
playing our game.” That game is globalization, 
and its dominant rules are set predominantly by 
the West. Therefore, China will increasingly be-
come a responsible stakeholder in the existing 
global order
26
. This argument has some credit, 
because indeed the relationship between China 
and the international system has profoundly and 
irreversibly changed during the past decades. As 
some Western scholars also acknowledge, China 
has changed its role from “the resistor to the in-
ternational system”, to “the reformer of the inter-
national system” and now “the protector of the 
international system”
 27
.  
As shown above, the accusation of 
“free-rider” and the evaluation of “stake-holder” 
simultaneously exist with regard to China’s 
growing role in international organizations. In the 
future engagement with international organiza-
tions, China is facing an even greater challenge of 
dealing with the balance between national inter-
ests and international contribution, rights and ob-
ligations, leadership and accountability. As China 
continues to rise, and US and European powers 
decline relatively, China will be expected and 
required to provide more public goods for the 
international system. However, it is self-evident 
that only when China strengthens its own hard 
and soft power both at home and internationally 
could it provide more public goods to the interna-
tional society, and thus contribute more to interna-
tional organizations.  
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